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Using a firm-level survey database covering 48 countries, we investigate how financial and 
institutional development affects financing of large and small firms.  Our database is not limited 
to large firms, but includes small and medium firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing 
sources, including leasing, supplier, development and informal finance.  Small firms and firms in 
countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance. Protection of 
property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms, 
mainly due to its effect on bank and equity finance. Small firms do not use disproportionately 
more leasing or trade finance compared to larger firms. Financing from these sources is positively 
associated with the financial development and does not compensate for lower access to bank 
financing of small firms in countries with underdeveloped institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent cross-country papers studying the financing patterns around the world 
emphasize the importance of institutional differences across countries  on capital 
structure ( Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2001; Fan, Titman and Twite, 2003). A related literature  has also shown 
that access to external financing is shaped by the country’s legal and financial 
environment ( La  Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV), 1997, 1998; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998;  Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
1 A direct 
implication of these studies is that in countries with weak legal systems, and 
consequently, weak financial systems, firms obtain less external financing and that this 
results in lower growth. 
Due to data limitations, empirical results in the existing literature are based on 
analysis of the largest, and perhaps unrepresentative, firms across countries. Also, the 
definitions of external financing used in these studies focus on equity and external debt, 
and do not take into account the possibility that in some countries firms may substitute 
other forms of financing, such as supplier credit or government financing.  
In this paper we investigate whether the financing patterns of small firms differ 
from those of the large firms that have been the focus of the prior literature.  We also 
explore the relation between small firms’ external financing and a country’s financial and 
                                                 
1 Carlin and Mayer (2003) argue that there exists a relation between a country’s financial system and the 
characteristics of industries that prosper in the country. The importance of institutional development for 
investment is demonstrated by Wurgler (2000) and Love (2003), who show that the flow of capital to good 
investment projects increases with financial development. At the macro level, King and Levine (1993), 
Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) show that financial development promotes 
growth and that differences in legal origins explain differences in financial development.    3
legal institutions and consider a broader spectrum of external financing sources that are 
likely to be more relevant for smaller firms.  
Better understanding the financing patterns of small firms and how they change 
with institutional development has important policy and resource  implications.  Many 
policymakers in governmental and international aid organizations believe that small firms 
have inadequate access to external finance in developing countries as a result of market 
imperfections.  In response, significant resources are being channeled into the promotion  
and financing of  small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries.  
For example, the World Bank Group has approved more than $10 billion in SME support 
programs in the past five years, $1.5 billion of it in the last year alone (World Bank 
Group Review of Small Business Activities, 2002).
2   There is also significant renewed 
interest in development banks, whose mission is to provide loans that promote 
development by lending to constrained borrowers in developing countries, particularly 
small firms. Understanding how financing patterns of small firms differ in different 
institutional environments is an important first step in assessing these costly policies.  
We address these issues using a new data source, the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), a major cross-sectional firm level survey conducted in 
developed and developing countries in 1999 and led by the World Bank.  The survey has 
information on financing choices for close to 3000 firms in 48 countries.
3 One of the 
important strengths of the survey is its coverage of small and medium enterprises; eighty 
                                                 
2 The World Bank provides direct and indirect support to SMEs.  In terms of activities, 80 percent of World 
Bank programs involve direct financial assistance to SMEs, while the remaining 20 percent involve indirect 
support such as technical assistance for SMEs and for institutions that support SME development. 
3 A detailed discussion of the database is provided in next section. Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2002), 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004, 2005) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic 
(2005) also use this data set.  See Graham and Harvey (2001) for a recent application of the survey 
methodology to corporate finance.   4
percent of the observations are from small and medium firms.  The other advantage is 
that it includes information on sources of financing that are often associated with small-
firm finance such as leasing, trade credit and finance from government and informal 
sources.  Finally, the survey includes an indicator of  to what extent firms consider 
themselves financially-constrained.  This allows us to distinguish constrained firms 
without having to rely on proxies based on accounting data.  
Our results show that, even after we control for various firm characteristics and 
country and institutional variables, smaller firms finance a lower proportion of their 
investment externally, particularly because they make use of bank finance to lesser extent. 
Further investigating the linkages between firm size and the impact of institutional 
development on financing patterns, we see that small firms benefit disproportionally from 
higher levels of property rights protection and  use significantly more external finance, 
particularly from banks and equity markets. These results underline the importance of 
improving the institutional environment for increasing the access of small firms to 
external finance.   
We would expect that small firms, facing informational asymmetries in financial 
markets, would substitute subsidized financing from government and financing from 
sources that rely on personal or commercial relationships, such as trade credit or informal 
finance. We would also expect that such sources would be more significant in countries 
with poorly functioning financial systems or weak property rights protection.
 4 
                                                 
4 Biais and Gollier (1998) and Frank and Maksimovic (2001) argue that trade credit relaxes the borrowing 
constraints caused by asymmetries of information and costly bankruptcy proceedings. As a result, we 
would expect trade credit to be a substitute for bank lending to small firms in countries with poor financial 
and legal systems.   5
We do find that small firms use significantly more informal finance than large 
firms. However, financing from such sources is very limited.  On average the proportion 
of investment financed using informal finance is less than two percent. Thus, the use of 
informal financing does little to relax financial constraints faced by small firms in 
developing economies. 
Moreover, we find that small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or 
trade finance compared to larger firms.  In particular, financing from these sources does 
not fill in the financing gap of small firms in countries with underdeveloped institutions 
since the use of these financing sources is positively associated with the development of 
financial institutions and equity markets.  
Surprisingly, small firms also finance their investment significantly less from 
government sources or development banks despite the fact that such programs are often 
politically justified as increasing financing for small firms.     
These findings point out the limits to small firms’ ability to compensate for the 
underdevelopment of their countries’ financial and legal systems.  In these countries, the 
alternative sources of finance either do not significantly fill the gap, or, in the case of 
trade credit, are less prevalent.  
In the next section we discuss our methodology and data.  The results are 
presented in Section 3 and we conclude in Section 4.  Detailed data definitions are in the 
Appendix. 
2. Data and Methodology 
There are a number of studies that focus on cross-country comparisons of 
financing patterns.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) explore capital structure decisions of firms   6
in seven developed countries and find that variables which are commonly used to explain 
financial structure in the U.S. are also correlated with leverage in their sample of 
international firms.  Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) consider 
financing choices in a sample of ten developing countries and also show that financing 
decisions are affected by the same variables as in developed countries.   However, they 
also note large fixed effects across countries, indicating that specific country factors are 
at work.  Booth et al (2001) conclude that much remains to be done to understand the 
impact of different institutional features on capital structure.  Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) examine capital structure in 30 developed and developing countries 
and show that differences in financing patterns are indeed mostly due to the differences in 
the development of stock markets and banks, as well as differences in the underlying 
legal infrastructure.  Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) study capital structure in 39 countries 
and confirm earlier findings that institutional differences between countries are much 
more important in determining capital structure choices of firms compared to other 
factors, such as industry affiliation.   
In a related literature,  Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) both show a relation between the development of financial 
institutions, external financing and firm performance.  Taken together, the implication of 
these studies is that in countries with underdeveloped institutions, firms have different 
financing patterns which have direct implications on their performance and growth. 
All these studies rely on databases of listed firms so that even the “small” firms in 
their samples are relatively large.  The studies also implicitly define external finance 
narrowly, focusing on equity finance or long-term debt. Theory suggests that firms in   7
countries with strong legal systems, in which property rights and in particular the rights 
of investors are enforced, are likely to rely on these types of external finance. In countries 
with weaker property rights protection, we would expect substitute forms of external 
finance, such as informal and supplier credit or development bank financing, to be used.  
Thus, a narrow definition of external financing that does not take into account other 
forms of financing might overstate both the constraints on external financing available to 
firms in less developed countries and the importance of legal development for the 
financing of firms in these countries.
5 Also, while these sources are not normally 
included in the U.S. studies of external financing, variations in leasing, supplier, and 
government financing may be potentially important when assessing differences in 
countries’ financial systems.
6 Looking at all available sources of external finance is 
especially important when studying financing choices of small firms as we do in this 
paper.   
We use firm level survey data to investigate the proportion of investment firms 
finance externally, focusing on the differences between small and large firms.  We also 
investigate individual sources of finance, such as debt finance and equity, but also other 
available sources such as leasing, supplier, government and informal finance.  The firm 
level data are from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a major cross-
sectional survey conducted in developed and developing countries in 1999 and led by the 
                                                 
5 In some countries these informal financial systems are prevalent and economically significant. For 
example the amount of foreign transfers through the [informal] hawala system in Pakistan, estimated by the 
Minister of Finance to be between  $2 billion to $5 billion annually, exceeds the amount transferred 
through the country's banking system (New York Times, October 3, 2001). 
6 Frank and Maksimovic (1998) argue that the equilibrium amount of trade finance relative to bank and 
equity financing is influenced by a country’s legal and financial system. See Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001) for cross–country evidence.   8
World Bank.   Information on financing patterns is available for nearly 3000 firms in 48 
countries.
7   
  An important strength of the survey is its wide coverage of small and medium 
firms. The survey covers three groups of firms.  Small firms are defined as those with 5 
to 50 employees.  Medium firms are those that employ 51 to 500 employees and large 
firms are those that employ more than 500 employees.  Forty percent of our observations 
are from small firms, another forty percent are from medium firms and the remaining 
twenty percent are from large firms.  Notice that the sample is size-stratified for each 
country and there was an effort to focus on small and medium firms.   Thus, the survey 
data have a selection bias since respondents are not necessarily a representative sample of 
firms from their countries.   However, analysis of mostly smaller firms does represent a 
nice complement to earlier cross-country studies in the literature, which all inevitably 
include a similar, but opposite selection bias by focusing on the largest firms in their 
samples of diverse countries.  Table AI in the Appendix reports the number of firms for 
each country and each size group in the sample.   
The survey data also has shortcomings. While it provides information on 
complete financing patterns, financial information is very limited.  Importantly, financing 
patterns are given in terms of proportions of financing, not as debt to asset ratios, as is 
common in the previous literature.  Furthermore, we do not have a complete set of firm 
level variables to replicate the usual set of firm level controls used in capital structure 
papers, particularly profitability of firms.  However, we do have information on firm 
employment, sales, industry, growth, ownership, and whether the firm is an exporter or 
                                                 
7 The survey actually covers 80 economies, but the sample is reduced because of missing firm-level or 
country information.   9
has been receiving subsidies from national or local authorities.  Most importantly, we 
also have information on how important firms consider financing obstacles to be in 
affecting the operation and growth of their business.  Using this information to 
distinguish financially-constrained from unconstrained firms, we hope to compensate for 
the paucity of firm level financial information as we further discuss below.  
  In Table I we summarize relevant facts about the level of economic and financial 
development in the sample countries.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the 
Appendix. Country level variables are 1995-1999 averages.  For each country we present 
data on GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP and inflation.  In addition, we present 
Private Credit, an indicator of financial intermediary development commonly used in the 
literature: the ratio of credit issued to the private sector by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to the GDP (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000). Countries 
with higher levels of Private Credit have been shown to grow faster (Beck, Levine and 
Loayza, 2000).   Stock market development is captured by Value Traded, which is given 
by value of shares traded divided by GDP and is a good indicator of stock market 
liquidity. Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck and Levine (2004) show a robust 
relationship between stock market liquidity and GDP per capita growth.  Finally, we also 
present an indicator of property rights protection, Property Rights, which is an indicator 
compiled by Heritage Foundation. Its values vary between 1 and 5, with greater values 
indicating a greater level of protection of private property rights.  While not an indicator 
of financial development, Property Rights measures a key input into the efficient 
operation of financial contracts and thus financial development: the degree of protection 
of private property rights (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003).   10
  Inspection of Table I reveals that there is a great deal of economic and financial 
variation in the sample countries.  Economic development ranges from Haiti, with an 
average GDP per capita of 369 dollars to U.S. and Germany, with per capita income of 
over $30,000.    The countries also vary significantly in the rate of inflation, from a low 
of zero percent in the cases of Sweden and Argentina, up to 86 percent in the case of 
Bulgaria.  Both financial intermediary and stock market development, Private Credit and 
Value Traded, are higher in more developed countries although there is still significant 
variation at different levels of development.  Property rights protection also increases 
with GDP per capita in general, but there are many exceptions.  For example, Chinese 
income per capita is higher than that of Pakistan’s, but property rights protection in 
Pakistan is rated highly at 4, whereas Chinese rating is one of the lowest at 2. We expect 
firms in countries with higher levels of financial development to have better access to 
external finance. However, it is not clear if different sources of external finance are 
affected by financial development to the same extent or if firms of all sizes benefit 
equally. 
Insert Table I here 
  Table II reports firm-level financing patterns averaged over all firms in each 
country.  In the WBES, enterprise managers were asked: “Please identify the share of 
your firm’s financing over the last year coming from each of the following sources.”  The 
sources are internal financial sources such as retained earnings or funds from family and 
friends
8, and external financial sources, such as equity, local commercial banks, foreign 
                                                 
8 We recognize that whether funds from family and friends qualify as internal or external sources might be 
controversial. We also have the problem that funds from “friends and family” might be debt and equity. 
However this category is very limited, since no more than one or two percent of investment is financed   11
banks, supplier credit, leasing arrangements, development banks and other government 
services or informal sources, such as moneylenders.  The sum of these proportions adds 
up to one hundred percent.
9    
  We categorize the different sources of external financing into six groups. Bank 
Finance includes financing from local and foreign banks.  Equity Finance is financing 
through issue of stock.  Leasing Finance and Supplier Finance are funding through 
leasing arrangements and trade credit, respectively. Development Finance is funding 
from special development financing or other state services. Finally, finance from 
moneylenders and other traditional sources are classified as Informal Finance.  
  We recognize that our financing pattern variables are different that those 
commonly used in the literature.  For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
focus on debt maturity and analyze long term debt to total asset and long term debt to 
total debt ratios. In our case, we do not have information on the amount of debt or total 
assets.  We only know the proportion of investment financed from a particular source 
over the last year, where the denominator (unavailable) is the total amount of internal and 
external resources used for firm financing.  Firm financing refers to capital expenditures, 
working capital, as well as acquisitions. Unfortunately, the WBES data does not allow us 
to distinguish between financing of working capital versus investment.    
Insert Figure 1 and Table II 
  
  As Figure 1 and the first column of Table II show, in most countries including 
developed ones such as the U.S., U.K. and Germany, firms use internal resources to 
                                                                                                                                                 
using sources from friends and family. Furthermore, we are more interested in sources rather than security 
types in this study. 
   12
finance a significant portion of their investment.  These figures are somewhat puzzling 
since firms in quite a few developing countries- such as Colombia, Malaysia, Poland and 
others – use more external finance than firms in the U.S., where financial and legal 
development is one of the highest rated.  It is not surprising that in some transitional 
countries with poorly developed institutions such as Armenia and Moldova internal 
financing of investment can be as high as 90 percent.   However, in the other extreme 
there are countries such as Italy and Trinidad and Tobago where internal financing is at 
about 30 percent. 
  Looking at different financing sources is informative since countries with similar 
overall external financing proportions can have very different financing patterns. For 
example, firms in Nicaragua and Chile appear to have similar financing patterns if one 
looks at only the external financing proportion.  However, Nicaraguan firms finance a 
large proportion of their investment using funds from development banks and supplier 
credit, whereas Chilean firms use much more bank finance.   More broadly, an inspection 
of the table indicates that in countries where bank and equity financing is more limited, 
firms rely more on other forms of external finance. Table II also shows that the most 
common source of external finance is bank finance followed by supplier credit. 
Insert Table III 
  Patterns of finance also vary quite a bit with firm characteristics, as can be seen in 
Table III, which reports the sample statistics of the variables we consider and their 
correlations.  Small firms tend to rely on internal finance to a greater extent, with lower 
proportions of bank finance.  However, the correlations indicate that small firms also use 
less supplier credit and receive less credit from development banks, while relying more 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 For a few firms, the sum were either greater or less than one hundred. These observations were omitted.   13
on informal finance.  Subsidized firms appear to receive some of these subsidies through 
bank loans and development financing.  Similarly, government firms seem to rely mostly 
on development financing. There are also differences among industries.  Manufacturing 
firms are the greatest users of external finance, particularly bank finance.  Since these 
firm characteristics are also correlated with size, it is important to control for them when 
investigating small firm financing patterns.  
  Finally, the WBES survey asked enterprise managers to rate the extent to which 
financing problems presented obstacles to the operation and growth of their business.  A 
rating of one denotes no obstacle; two, a minor obstacle; three, a moderate obstacle; and 
four, a major obstacle.  In the regressions this variable allows us to capture the extent to 
which a firm is “financially constrained” without relying on accounting data such as 
profits, dividends and the like.
10  The correlations in Table III B suggest that firms 
reporting higher financing obstacles use less equity finance but substitute external finance 
from other sources such as leasing, supplier, development and informal sources. The 
correlations also indicate that small firms report facing higher financing obstacles.   
  Table III also shows that the indicators of financial development are significantly 
correlated with external financing and different sources of finance.  Financial 
development, as measured by any of our three indicators, is positively correlated with the 
proportion of investment financed externally.  Financial intermediary development, 
                                                 
10 Using survey data has problems in that it is possible for managers to blame financing obstacles for their 
own poor performance.  However, this likelihood must be balanced by the likelihood that accounting data 
used in cross-country research are also subject to distortion. Although the auditing process provides some 
control, the quality of these audits tend to vary systematically across countries and firm size.  While we 
cannot completely eliminate the possibility of bias due to un-audited self-reporting, we believe that it is 
unlikely to be a significant source of bias. First, Hellman et al. (2000) show that in a sub-sample of 20 
countries there is a close connection between responses and measurable outcomes.  They find no systematic 
bias in the survey responses.  Second,  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) show that survey   14
Private Credit, is highly correlated with use of bank finance and stock market 
development, Value Traded, is correlated with the use of equity.  Finally, better 
protection of property rights, Property Rights, is positively correlated with bank, equity 
and leasing finance. However, we also note that many of the macroeconomic and 
financial indicators are correlated with each other.  
  Since Table III indicates that there is a high degree of correlation between 
financing patterns and institutions, as well as other firm- and country-level variables, we 
use multivariate regression to clarify these relationships.  The dependent variables are the 
proportions of investment financed by external financing or through different sources of 
external finance.  Since the observations are censored by zero and 100, we use Tobit 
regressions to estimate the financing patterns.  To control for unobserved country-specific 
effects not captured by any of our country-level variables, we estimate a random effects 
model: 
 Financingi,k = α + β Firm Characteristicsi  + γ Macroeconomic factorsk  + δ 
Institutional factorsk + μk + εi,k .                    (1)                                      
  The dependent variable is the proportion of investment financed by firm i in 
country k through external finance or different external financing sources, respectively.  
The regression also includes firm and country level controls.   Firm level variables 
identify the firm’s size, ownership, type of business, industry and sales growth.
 
Specifically we include dummy variables for government-owned firms, foreign firms, 
exporting firms, and subsidy receivers.  To control for firm size, we include dummy 
variables that identify the firm as a small or medium firm.  We also include dummy 
                                                                                                                                                 
responses are significantly correlated with actual outcomes after controlling for many factors and using 
instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity.   15
variables for manufacturing firms and those in the service industry.  Finally, we use 
financing obstacle variable reported by firms to control for financing constraints of firms. 
  These variables do not correspond one-to-one to more conventional firm level 
controls used by earlier papers.  For example, papers in the literature generally include 
descriptors of firms’ operating characteristics, or asset tangibility, such as net fixed assets 
to total assets and net sales to net fixed asset ratios as determinants of capital structure.  
Firms that operate with greater fixed assets are shown to have greater borrowing capacity, 
whereas those firms with higher sales to asset ratio are more likely to need more short 
term financing to support sales (see Demirguc- Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).  We do not 
have these variables available, yet we use indicators of firms’ industry and type of 
business to capture, at least partially, the differences in its operating characteristics. 
  Papers in the literature also commonly include indicators of firms’ growth 
opportunities, such as firms’ market to book ratio of equity (see Rajan and Zingales,1995 
and Booth et al., 2001).  Again, lacking such data we include firms’ sales growth rate 
over the last three years as an indicator of future growth opportunities.  Dummy variables 
indicating whether the firm is owned by the government or foreigners, and whether it is 
an exporter or subsidy receiver are also expected to control for differences in growth 
opportunities.   
  Finally, capital structure studies cited above include indicators of firm 
profitability, such as return on assets, or dividend payments to total assets to capture cash 
constraints of firms.  Higher dividend payout ratios are taken as indicators of cash surplus 
relative to investment needs, making the firm less likely to finance externally.  While the 
proper interpretation of profitability ratios is much more controversial, again higher   16
profits are negatively associated with external financing, potentially capturing lower 
levels of constraints.  We do not have this information, yet we use the survey responses to 
identify whether the firms are financially constrained or not.  We expect those firms 
reporting higher financing obstacles to have a greater need for external finance and thus 
use this variable as a proxy for cash constraints of firms. 
  Macroeconomic control variables are the GDP per capita, its growth rate, and the 
rate of inflation. Finally, we include variables to capture the impact of financial 
development and the extent of protection of property rights in the country.  These are 
Private Credit, Value Traded, and Property Rights.   Use of similar control variables is 
standard in the literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999, 2001). 
Using this basic model, we explore a number of questions.  First, we investigate 
whether a firm’s total use of external financing depends on its characteristics, particularly 
its size, and on its country’s financial institutions and protection of property rights.
11  
Second, replacing the total proportion of investment financed externally with the 
proportion financed using a specific financing source allows us to explore financing 
patterns from individual sources such as bank, equity and supplier finance.  As we can 
see in Table II, it is possible for overall external financing to be similar in countries with 
very different financing mixes.  Third, since firm size is an important determinant of how 
much access firms have to external finance, we also explore the impact of different 
                                                 
11 While property rights protection is an exogenous variable,  papers that study the relationship between 
financial development and access to finance at the country level generally suffer from simultaneity issues in 
that it is not clear if it is the use of a particular type of financing (debt or equity) that leads to the 
development of debt or equity markets rather than vice versa.  See for example Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and others.  However, since in this paper we analyze 
financing patterns of individual firms the causality is much more likely to go from country level financial 
development to individual firm financing choices.  Further, none of our dependent variables – proportion of 
external finance or different sources  - measures the actual quantity of financing as does Private Credit or 
the ratio of traded shares to GDP, as does Value Traded.   17
institutions on the financing patterns of firms of different sizes through use of interaction 
terms.  Finally, we explore whether the relationship between financing obstacles and 
financing patterns varies across firm size.  
The coefficients in the Tobit regressions cannot be interpreted as marginal effects 
of the explanatory variable on the observed dependent variables.  Rather, they are the 
marginal effect of the underlying unobserved variables.  In the text, we therefore also 
discuss unconditional marginal effects of the observed dependent variable. These 
marginal effects do not only take into account the change in financing for firms with 
financing of a specific sources between zero and 100 but also changes in the probability 
that the financing proportion of a firm falls in this range (Maddala, 1986).     
3.   Results 
  Table IV studies firm- and country-level determinants of financing patterns. The 
most important variables of interest are the size dummies- Small and Medium – and 
indicators of financial and institutional development - Private Credit, Value Traded, and 
Property Rights.  These are entered individually in Panels A-C and entered together in 
Panel D. In each panel, the first column assesses the determinants of the proportion of 
investment financed with external sources of finance. We define external finance as 
consisting of bank, equity, leasing, supplier, development, informal and other finance.  
The remaining six columns explore determinants of the individual external financing 
sources.
12 
Results in Table IV show that even after controlling for firm and country 
characteristics, smaller firms use on average less external finance.  This differential in 
                                                 
12 We do not explore other finance, since WBES does not provide any information about this residual 
category and since it constitutes less than one percent of external financing sources.    18
external financing is mainly due to the use of less bank finance and less funding from 
development banks and other state sources. On the other hand, we find that small firms 
finance themselves significantly more with informal finance, although this does not make 
up for the overall shortfall in external finance since the extent of informal finance is 
typically very limited.  The relationship between firm size and use of external (bank) 
finance is monotonic, increasing as we go from small, to medium and to large firms, 
while the use of informal finance decreases as we go from small to medium to large 
firms.
13 The relationship is also economically significant. The marginal effects for Panel 
D suggest that small firms finance on average 13 percentage points less of investment 
with external finance than large firms, which compares with a mean External Finance of 
41% and a standard deviation of 38%.  The relative economic effect is even stronger for 
Bank Finance, where the difference between small and large firms is 12 percentage 
points, compared to a mean Bank Finance of 19% and a standard deviation of 28%. 
When we compare the use of equity finance, there is no robust evidence that the use of 
these financing sources varies with firm size. We find some evidence that medium-sized 
firms use more supplier credit and leasing finance than small and large firms.
14  
The results also indicate that firms reporting greater financing obstacles are the 
ones that use more external finance, from all sources except equity finance.  This is 
consistent with prior literature which argues that those firms that are more cash 
constrained are more likely to finance externally, preferring to use debt financing more 
heavily before they use equity finance due to higher adverse selection costs in equity 
markets (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
                                                 
13 The difference between small and medium firms is significant at least at the 6% level.   19
 Firms in countries with better financial and institutional development, as captured 
by Private Credit and Property Rights, finance a greater proportion of their investment 
externally.  We also see that financial intermediary development, Private Credit, is 
associated with the use of more bank finance, while stronger property rights protection 
contributes to greater use of bank and equity finance. Stock market development seems to 
foster the use of leasing finance and, surprisingly, the use of informal finance.  When we 
introduce all three financial variables together, we find that Value Traded is positively, 
while Private Credit is negatively related to the use of equity finance. The effects of both 
Private Credit and Property Rights on External Finance are strong. The average firm in 
Chile (75
th percentile of Private Credit) uses 10 percentage points more external finance 
than the average firm in Costa Rica (25
th percentile of Private Credit).  The average firm 
in Uruguay (75
th percentile of Property Rights) uses eight percentage points more 
external finance than the average firm in Venezuela (25
th percentile of Property Rights).
15 
Insert Table IV 
Turning to the country-level control variables, the results suggest that firms in 
richer, more developed countries rely more on external finance, particularly equity 
finance.  Higher levels of inflation do not have a significant effect on the overall reliance 
on external finance but are associated with greater use of leasing and development 
finance.  These results suggest that in high inflation environments firms may be 
substituting leasing and development finance for debt and equity finance. Leasing finance 
may provide better protection against inflation for investors.  Higher inflation is also 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The difference between Small and Medium is significant at the 1% level for supplier credit and at 10% 
for leasing finance. 
15 Note that Private Credit variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the private credit to GDP. A more precise 
definition is in the Appendix.   20
associated with lower levels of financial development and underdeveloped debt and 
equity markets in general.  Thus governments may be using some of the inflation tax (that 
represses private sources of external finance) to finance government sources of external 
finance, which are likely to be less efficient.     
Table IV also identifies several other firm characteristics that predict differences 
in the way investment is funded. Government firms finance larger proportion of their 
investment using development finance, but less bank finance.  Compared to other firms 
subsidized firms also finance larger proportion of their investment from government 
sources, which explains their higher use of external finance in general.  Their heavy 
reliance on development finance sources also suggests that this form of financing may be 
a conduit for subsidies. Exporters are another group that use significantly greater external 
finance, but they do this through greater use of bank debt and leasing and supplier 
finance. Foreign-owned firms, on the other hand finance their investment relying less on 
leasing and supplier finance but more on equity.   
Having established that both firm size and institutional development are important 
determinants of financing patterns across firms and countries, next we investigate if 
financial and institutional development affects financing patterns of different size firms 
differently since improving small firms’ access to finance is an important policy concern 
in the development community. 
                                                Insert Table V 
Table V replicates Table IV, but interacts each institutional variable with three 
size dummies, Small, Medium and Large, which take the value one if the firm is a small, 
medium or large firm, or zero otherwise.  This allows us to see if changes in financial and   21
institutional development affect financing patterns of different size firms differently.
16 
We also interact Financing Obstacle with the three size dummies to explore whether the 
relationship between financing obstacles and patterns varies across firms of different 
sizes.   At the end of each panel, we also present tests of the differences between the 
effects of financial and institutional development and of financing obstacles on small and 
on large firms. To save space, we only report the results for the size dummies and the 
interactions with the indicators of financial and institutional development and financing 
obstacles. 
  The results in Table V show that institutional development, particularly better 
protection of property rights, affect small firms’ financing patterns the most. The effect of 
better-developed financial intermediaries on the share of investment financed with 
external finance, especially bank finance, is stronger for small firms than for medium and 
large firms (Panel A), although the difference is not significant.  Higher levels of 
financial intermediary development also result in small firms using significantly more 
bank and leasing finance, although large firms also increase their reliance on bank debt.  
Stock market development increases the use of equity and leasing finance for firms of all 
sizes, with no significant difference across firm size classes.   The impact of better 
property right protection on the use of external finance is significantly greater for small 
firms than for large firms. This is due to the significantly stronger impact of property 
rights on the use of bank and equity finance for small compared to large firms.  Unlike 
small firms, medium and large firms’ financing patterns do not vary significantly with 
improvements in protection of property rights.  
                                                 
16 We do not include the panel with all three indicators interacted with size dummies simultaneously 
because of concerns of multi-collinearity.    22
  The effect of Property Rights on closing the “external financing gap” between 
small and large firms is relatively large. Small firms in Uruguay (75
th percentile of 
Property Rights) finance 9 percentage points more investment with external finance than 
small firms in Venezuela (25
th percentile of Property Rights), while the difference is only 
three percentage points for large firms.   
  The results also indicate that the relationship between financing obstacles and 
patterns holds for large, but not for small firms.  As we have seen before, large firms that 
report higher financing obstacles tend to use external financing significantly more, from 
most sources except equity.  However, the interaction of financing obstacles with the 
small firm dummy only enters in the External Finance regression and mostly at the 10% 
significance level.  This suggests that while larger, cash-constrained firms are more likely 
to meet their external financing need and obtain financing from different sources,  the 
ability of smaller cash-constrained firms to obtain external financing is more limited and 




  We investigate how firm financing patterns differ around the world for large 
versus small firms. Using a unique firm-level survey database in 48 countries, we find 
that firm size, financial development and property rights protection are important factors 
in explaining the observed variation in financing patterns.  In contrast to earlier literature, 
eighty percent of our sample is composed of small- and medium-sized firms. We examine 
a broader spectrum of external financing sources which not only includes debt and equity 
finance, but also leasing and supplier finance, development bank and informal finance.    23
Our results indicate that firm size plays an important role in understanding 
financing patterns. Small firms use less external finance, especially bank finance.  But 
small firms also benefit the most from better protection of  property rights and financial 
intermediary development, and even stock market development in terms of accessing 
formal sources of external finance.  Interestingly, finance from development banks and 
other government sources are used to a greater extent by larger firms.  Similarly, leasing 
and supplier finance does not fill in the financing gap of small firms in countries with 
underdeveloped institutions since smalls firms are only able to increase their use of this 
financing source as financial institutions and equity markets develop.  Thus, the most 
effective way of improving small firms’ access to external finance appears to be through 
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                 Figure 1. Financing Patterns Around the World.  Internal finance is the proportion of investment financed 
                 by retained earnings and from family and friends.  All other financing are considered external.  Values reported 
                 are firm averages by country.  Countries are ranked in descending order according to internal financing. 
   28
Table I 
Economic, Financial and Institutional Indicators  
 
GDP per capita is real GDP per capita in US$. Inflation is the log difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth is the growth rate of GDP in 
US$. Private credit is financial sector credit to private sector divided by GDP.  Value Traded is the value of shares traded to GDP.  Property 
Rights is rating from 1-5 of the degree to which property rights are protected in a nation.  All country variables are 1995-1999 averages.  
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  
 GDP/capita Inflation Growth Private  Value  Traded Property  Rights
Argentina 8000.15  0.00 0.02 0.21 0.04  4
Armenia 844.11  0.10 0.04 0.06 0.00  3
Belarus 2234.91  0.71 0.07 0.06 0.00  3
Belize 2737.70  0.01 0.00 0.43 0.00  4
Bolivia 938.55  0.06 0.01 0.51 0.00  3
Brazil 4491.67  0.07 0.00 0.32 0.17  3
Bulgaria 1414.61  0.86 -0.02 0.14 0.00  3
Canada 20548.97  0.01 0.02 0.83 0.49  5
Chile 5002.70  0.05 0.03 0.68 0.11  5
China 676.76  0.02 0.07 0.85 0.27  2
Colombia 2381.19  0.16 -0.01 0.36 0.02  3
Costa Rica  3692.47  0.12 0.04 0.15 0.00  3
Croatia 3845.27  0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00  2
Czech Republic 5158.04  0.07 0.00 0.58 0.11  4
Dominican Republic 1712.31  0.06 0.06 0.24 0.00  2
El Salvador 1705.79  0.04 0.01 0.36 0.00  3
Estonia 3663.49  0.10 0.05 0.16 0.12  4
France 27719.92  0.01 0.02 0.84 0.28  4
Germany 30794.03  0.01 0.01 1.06 0.43  5
Guatemala 1503.25  0.08 0.01 0.18 0.00  3
Haiti 368.73  0.14 0.00 0.12 0.00  1
Honduras 707.52  0.16 0.00 0.26 0.03  3
Hungary 4705.65  0.15 0.04 0.22 0.02  4
Indonesia 1045.04  0.20 -0.02 0.52 0.13  3
Italy 19645.96  0.02 0.01 0.57 0.19  4
Lithuania 1907.93  0.09 0.03 0.11 0.01  3
Malaysia 4536.23  0.03 0.01 1.30 1.14  4
Mexico 3394.75  0.20 0.04 0.22 0.12  3
Moldova 667.74  0.18 -0.03 0.06 0.06  3
Nicaragua 434.69  0.11 0.03 0.31 0.00  2
Pakistan 505.59  0.08 0.00 0.23 0.13  4
Panama 3123.95  0.01 0.02 0.78 0.00 3
Peru 2334.94  0.07 0.01 0.18 0.06  3
Philippines 1125.81  0.08 0.01 0.50 0.23  4
Poland 3216.04  0.13 0.05 0.12 0.04  4
Romania 1372.02  0.53 -0.02 0.09 0.01  2
Singapore 24948.09  0.01 0.02 1.11 0.61  5
Slovak Republic 3805.41  0.07 0.04 0.30 0.08  3
Slovenia 10232.73  0.08 0.04 0.26 0.02  3
Spain 15858.03  0.02 0.03 0.79 0.66  4
Sweden 28258.28  0.00 0.02 0.82 0.66  4
Trinidad and Tobago 4526.28  0.04 0.04 0.40 0.02  5
Turkey 2993.89  0.58 0.01 0.16 0.28  4
Ukraine 866.52  0.26 -0.03 0.02 0.00  3
United Kingdom 20186.56  0.03 0.02 1.16 0.73  5
United States  29250.32  0.02 0.03 1.84 1.12  5
Uruguay 6113.60  0.15 0.02 0.27 0.00  4
Venezuela, RB  3482.51  0.40 -0.02 0.10 0.02  3  29
Table II 
Financing Patterns Around the World 
 
Figures given are firm averages for each country and they are the proportion of investment financed by each source. 
External finance includes financing from banks, equity, operations and other finance. Bank finance includes financing 








Bank  Informal 
Argentina 43.45  29.99 2.81 0.75 7.48 1.60  0.82
Armenia 11.42  4.53 0.00 1.08 0.88 3.58 0.68
Belarus 20.36  5.73 1.09 0.90 3.13 9.40 0.12
Belize 38.93  20.36 13.57 0.00 3.21 1.79  0.00
Bolivia 38.97  27.02 0.00 0.00 8.26 0.29  0.74
Brazil 51.80  23.06 6.88 4.65 11.37 4.20  0.40
Bulgaria 26.78  6.03 1.38 3.45 6.47 3.82 2.87
Canada 48.55  23.45 8.39 2.39 3.39 5.93 5.00
Chile 57.34  41.34 0.26 2.57 7.71 0.48  1.00
China 29.93  10.17 2.41 1.63 2.41 4.63  5.93
Colombia 55.22  29.18 0.37 1.97 12.45 4.78 0.00
Costa Rica  37.92  21.13 0.19 0.15 7.54 2.08  1.35
Croatia 41.31  19.79 3.02 0.31 8.19 6.23 2.47
Czech Republic 32.50  13.90 0.66 3.90 3.75 6.84  3.46
Dominican Republic 42.58  25.32 0.56 0.08 10.40 0.95 1.77
El Salvador 55.00  32.03 4.59 0.54 9.19 3.92  0.14
Estonia 60.14  20.81 14.71 9.46 6.96 3.07 3.35
France 30.91  6.76 5.76 4.30 7.36 1.42  1.67
Germany 54.29  16.84 23.13 0.74 0.94 8.52  4.13
Guatemala 57.34  28.38 1.09 2.78 18.72 2.63 0.63
Haiti 24.17  10.83 0.24 0.24 2.38 10.24  0.24
Honduras 44.33  29.17 1.00 0.00 9.00 2.67  2.50
Hungary 35.86  13.99 6.96 2.41 5.06 6.05  1.39
Indonesia 21.83  17.17 0.00 1.67 0.67 1.67 0.00
Italy 77.71  49.67 6.88 1.67 5.83 1.17  4.17
Lithuania 39.60  12.42 11.74 4.08 5.24 1.32 4.79
Malaysia 40.62  13.81 4.76 3.48 13.81 4.05  0.71
Mexico 34.33  6.83 7.00 0.33 11.17 5.33 3.50
Moldova 20.07  10.11 0.49 2.01 4.40 2.22 0.83
Nicaragua 56.70  19.32 1.36 0.91 15.23 7.61  3.18
Pakistan 43.13  29.96 5.63 1.50 2.92 1.04 2.08
Panama 64.02  47.15 2.07 1.22 5.00 1.17 0.24
Peru 35.53  20.90 0.50 0.50 9.08 1.68 0.88
Philippines 36.55  17.49 1.96 1.41 10.84 4.49  0.36
Poland 58.60  15.44 27.58 4.50 4.60 4.33  1.72
Romania 25.91  11.53 3.01 2.44 4.09 2.67 2.16
Singapore 45.17  28.06 7.67 1.16 6.14 0.58  0.00
Slovak Republic 30.84  9.26 1.17 10.23 4.00 3.45  2.60
Slovenia 38.55  16.99 3.51 2.88 8.27 4.61 1.04
Spain 39.78  23.00 0.67 8.04 4.22 2.62  1.22
Sweden 43.42  19.70 8.33 1.22 6.16 3.43  1.12
Trinidad and Tobago 71.35  40.00 12.73 0.85 15.18 1.85 0.00
Turkey 43.98  20.41 9.68 4.85 1.42 6.21  1.17
Ukraine 25.80  7.21 2.53 1.01 7.84 4.45  2.71
United Kingdom 36.12  13.14 11.56 2.91 7.47 0.58  0.47
United States  47.12  21.47 3.24 6.09 6.62 6.76 2.94
Uruguay 54.04  39.79 1.38 0.74 8.30 2.77  0.00
Venezuela, RB  28.73  14.80 3.05 0.50 5.88 1.75 0.25  30
Table III 
Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Summary statistics and correlation matrices are presented. N refers to firm level observations for 48 countries.  Bank finance, Equity, 
Leasing Supplier credit, Development bank, and Informal are financing proportions that stand for the proportion of investment 
financed externally, by bank debt, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development and public sector banks and money lenders, 
respectively.  Firm size-small takes the value 1 if the firm is a small firm and 0 otherwise.  Firm size – medium takes the value 1 if the 
firm is a medium firm and 0 otherwise. Manufacturing takes the value 1 for firms in manufacturing and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, 
Services takes the value 1 for firms in the services sector and 0 otherwise.  Firm growth is given by percent change in sales.   
Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  
Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Subsidized is also a dummy variable that indicates if the 
firm receives subsidies from the national or local authorities. GDP/ capita is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$.  Inflation is the 
log difference of the Consumer Price Index.  Growth is the growth rate of GDP in US$.  Financing Obstacles is an index which 
measures how problematic financing is to the operation and growth of a business.  Private Credit is the financial sector credit to the 
private sector divided by GDP.  Value Traded is the value of shares traded to GDP.  Property Rights is rating from 1-5 of the degree to 
which property rights are protected in a nation.  All country variables are 1995-1999 averages. Detailed variable definitions and 
sources are given in the appendix.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
External Finance  2935 40.90 38.03 0  100
Bank Finance  2935 19.00 28.13 0  100
Equity Finance  2935 5.57 17.39 0  100
Leasing 2935 2.63 10.22 0  100
Supplier Credit  2935 6.72 15.92 0  100
Development Bank  2935 3.82 13.91 0  100
Informal 2935 1.67 8.63 0  100
Firm Size - small  2935 0.39 0.49 0  1
Firm Size - medium  2935 0.42 0.49 0  1
Manufacturing 2935 0.40 0.49 0  1
Services 2935 0.47 0.50 0  1
Firm Growth  2935 0.14 0.56 -1  8
Subsidized 2935 0.12 0.32 0  1
Government 2935 0.13 0.33 0  1
Foreign 2935 0.19 0.39 0  1
Exporter 2935 0.41 0.49 0  1
Financing Obstacle  2935 2.83 1.13 1 4
GDP/capita 48 6848 8880 369  30794
Inflation 48 2.83 1.14 1 4
Growth 48 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.07
Private Credit  48 0.43 0.39 0.00 1.84
Value Traded  48 0.14 0.23 0.00 1.14
Property Rights  48 3.41 0.89 1 5  31
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
External 







Firm Size - 
small
Firm Size - 
medium Manufacturing Services 
External Finance  1       
Bank Finance  0.6154***  1     
Equity Finance  0.3467***  -0.0876***  1   
Leasing 0.2181***  -0.0453**  -0.0102 1  
Supplier Credit  0.3693***  -0.014  -0.0416** -0.0019 1  
Development Bank 0.2469***  -0.0988***  -0.0396** -0.0094 -0.0322* 1  
Informal 0.1531***  -0.0741***  -0.0097 -0.0016 0.0022 -0.0219 1 
Firm Size - small  -0.1773***  -0.1905*** 0.0158 0.0088 -0.035* -0.0981*** 0.0621*** 1
Firm Size - medium 0.0663***  0.044**  0.0044 0.0101 0.0458** 0.0642*** -0.0112 -0.6802*** 1
Manufacturing 0.0564***  0.1136***  -0.0537*** -0.0205 0.0281 0.0011 -0.0177 -0.2154*** 0.0971*** 1
Services -0.0312*  -0.081***  0.0267 0.0353* -0.0074 -0.0111 0.0134 0.204*** -0.1191*** -0.7663*** 1
Firm Growth  0.0484***  0.0073  0.0565*** 0.0276 -0.0048 0.0227 -0.0252 -0.0143 0.0145 -0.0269 0.0298
Subsidized 0.0993***  0.0364**  0.0049 0.0152 -0.0213 0.1788*** -0.0255 -0.1526*** 0.0581*** 0.03 -0.0686***
Government 0.0515***  -0.0288  0.0008 0.01 -0.0178 0.2045*** -0.029 -0.2511*** 0.1581*** 0.0992*** -0.0902***
Foreign 0.0678***  0.0865***  0.0301 -0.0443** -0.0143 -0.0136 -0.026 -0.2049*** 0.0104 0.1104*** -0.0365**
Exporter 0.1306***  0.138***  0.0233 0.0359* 0.0301 0.014 -0.0203 -0.2477*** 0.0813*** 0.3616*** -0.2888***
GDP/capita 0.0743***  0.0591***  0.0785*** 0.0172 -0.0224 -0.009 0.0083 -0.0291 0.0266 -0.0774*** 0.0717***
Inflation -0.0869***  -0.1081***  -0.053*** 0.0215 0.0104 0.0341* 0.0173 0.0781*** -0.0126 -0.0154 -0.0401***
Growth 0.1037***  0.0359*  0.1356*** 0.0495*** -0.022 0.0185 0.0164 -0.0135 0.0273 -0.0043 0.0188
Financing Obstacle  0.0256  -0.01  -0.048*** 0.0437** 0.0434** 0.053*** 0.0614*** 0.0609*** 0.0283 0.0539*** -0.1089***
Private Credit  0.0862***  0.107***  0.0026 0.0152 0.0026 -0.0217 0.0071 -0.0119 -0.0436** -0.0319* 0.0678***
Value Traded 0.0406**  0.0234 0.0503*** 0.0531*** -0.0192 -0.002 0.0081 0.0127 0.0011 -0.0653*** 0.0605***
Property Rights 0.1566***  0.1249***  0.1723*** 0.0569*** -0.0124 -0.0309* -0.0136 0.0099 0.0199 -0.1034*** 0.0754***













Firm Growth  1       
Subsidized 0.0043  1     
Government -0.036*  0.1838***  1   
Foreign 0.0458**  0.0207  -0.0171 1  
Exporter  0.0895*** 0.1164*** 0.1259*** 0.2069*** 1  
GDP/capita  0.0658*** 0.0822*** -0.0729*** 0.1036*** 0.0886*** 1  
Inflation  -0.0837*** -0.0678*** -0.0036 -0.1249*** -0.1518*** -0.36*** 1  
Growth 0.1299***  0.0463**  0.0826*** 0.0216 0.1393*** 0.1325*** -0.2423*** 1 
Financing Constraints -0.0998***  -0.0065  0.0707*** -0.1456*** -0.0284 -0.2339*** 0.2469*** -0.1363*** 1
Private Credit  0.0179  0.063***  -0.1535*** 0.1368*** 0.0454** 0.7404*** -0.3129*** 0.113*** -0.1999*** 1
Value Traded 0.0255  0.0676***  -0.1168*** 0.0725*** 0.033* 0.7541*** -0.2232*** 0.0767*** -0.1825*** 0.8411*** 1
Property Rights  0.0845*** 0.0657*** -0.1144*** 0.0519*** 0.0769*** 0.5751*** -0.2576*** 0.1457*** -0.2102*** 0.5339*** 0.5353*** 1
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively   32
 
Table IV 
Determinants of Financing Patterns 
The estimated panel random-effects Tobit model is (1) Financing Source = α + α1 Government + α2 Foreign +α3 Exporter +α4Subsidized + α5Manuf. + α6 Services +α7 
Firm Growth +α8 Small +α9 Medium + α10 GDP per capita + α11 Inflation+ α12 Growth + α13  Private credit/Property Rights/Value Traded/All +ε.   Financing proportions 
are the proportion of investment financed externally, bank debt, by equity, leasing supplier credit, development banks or money lenders (informal).  External finance is 
given by sum of bank, equity, operations and other finance.  Bank financing includes domestic and foreign bank financing.  Development bank is that provided by both 
development banks and the public sector.  Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership, 
respectively.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Subsidized is also a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives subsidies 
from the national or local authorities. Manufacturing takes the value 1 for firms in manufacturing sector and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, Services takes the value 1 for firms in 
the services sector and 0 otherwise.   Firm growth is given by sales growth.  Small takes the value 1 if the firm is a small firm and 0 otherwise.  Medium takes the value 1 
if the firm is a medium firm and 0 otherwise. Financing Obstacles is an index which measures how problematic financing is to the operation and growth of a business.  
GDP per capita is real GDP per capita in US$.  Inflation is the log difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth is the growth rate of GDP in US$.  Private credit is the 
financial institutions’ credit to the private sector divided by GDP.   Value Traded is the value of shares traded to GDP.  Property Rights is rating from 1-5 of the degree to 
which property rights are protected in a nation.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.    
Panel A:  Private Credit 
 
External 
finance Bank Equity Lease  Supplier  Credit
Development 
Bank Informal 
Government 4.265  -8.054** 1.53  -1.924  -4.052 33.719*** -6.495 
  [4.022] [3.743] [6.330] [4.039] [3.870] [5.290] [7.439] 
Foreign -0.632  -2.005  21.204***  -8.986** -6.018**  1.225  -0.352 
  [3.222] [2.894] [4.979] [3.506] [3.027] [5.009] [6.078] 
Exporter 6.175**  6.881***  -0.148 5.339*  6.124**  -4.015  0.532 
  [2.745] [2.504] [4.408] [2.771] [2.563] [4.318] [4.851] 
Subsidized 10.662*** -0.674  3.23 5.575  0.159  38.409***  -1.766 
  [3.742] [3.417] [5.850] [3.679] [3.522] [5.048] [7.044] 
Manufacturing 1.016  6.156*  -12.539** 1.22  6.857*  -7.12  -2.545 
  [3.925] [3.639] [6.198] [4.148] [3.792] [5.910] [6.746] 
Services 0.505  -1.343  -5.133  7.524* 5.128 -4.089 0.047 
  [3.774] [3.537] [5.814] [3.937] [3.687] [5.685] [6.326] 
Firm Growth  1.476  1.014  1.55 1.277 0.27  5.943*  0.174 
  [2.188] [2.028] [3.248] [2.069] [2.108] [3.316] [3.705] 
Small -25.416***  -27.599***  -6.874 -3.67 -2.192  -19.469***  28.339*** 
  [3.810] [3.421] [6.181] [4.072] [3.540] [5.836] [7.686] 
Medium -8.946***  -11.147***  -6.738 1.478 5.064 -2.172  19.660*** 
  [3.373] [2.977] [5.440] [3.635] [3.133] [4.912] [7.297] 
Financing Obstacle  5.871***  4.027*** 2.99  2.407**  2.868***  4.788***  8.544*** 
  [1.152] [1.062] [1.860] [1.187] [1.093] [1.844] [2.160] 
GDP per capita  5.917  2.812  16.382*** 6.109**  1.778  1.023  -0.839 
  [3.778] [2.553] [5.148] [2.417] [2.167] [2.049] [2.236] 
Inflation 0.376  -1.22  -0.415 2.831** -0.023 4.840** -1.211 
  [1.294] [1.157] [2.041] [1.333] [1.193] [1.966] [2.130] 
Growth 57.387  75.121  -95.215 76.415 -14.096 88.175  161.149** 
 [133.900]  [79.725]  [157.944]  [82.509] [84.708] [71.336] [79.195] 
Private Credit  3.740**  5.220***  -0.657 2.968 0.922 2.231 0.984 
  [1.679] [1.079] [4.235] [1.919] [1.334] [1.403] [1.554] 
Constant -17.199  -15.258  -213.867*** -117.800***  -60.107***  -105.584*** -123.190*** 
  [32.879] [21.160] [48.760] [23.138] [19.776] [21.920] [25.079] 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared 159***  168*** 48***  40***  33*** 156*** 37*** 
Small-Middle 0.000*** 0.000***  0.977 0.074*  0.007***  0.000***  0.067* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.   33
Panel B:  Value Traded 
 
External 
finance  Bank Equity Lease  Supplier  Credit
Development 
Bank  Informal 
Government 4.19  -8.284**  1.545 -1.919 -4.694  31.406***  -6.475 
  [3.882] [3.664] [6.161] [4.025] [3.855] [5.076] [7.292] 
Foreign -0.513  -2.008  21.144***  -8.958** -5.828*  1.845  -1.265 
  [3.220] [2.860] [4.969] [3.532] [3.025] [4.997] [6.093] 
Exporter 5.906**  6.977***  -0.263 5.280*  6.071**  -4.348  0.25 
  [2.750] [2.479] [4.382] [2.778] [2.567] [4.316] [4.817] 
Subsidized 10.571***  -0.933  3.135 5.198 0.402  38.780***  -2.346 
  [3.726] [3.380] [5.834] [3.672] [3.527] [5.057] [7.026] 
Manufacturing 1.201  5.949*  -12.819** 1.163  7.046*  -6.709  -2.734 
  [3.899] [3.608] [6.198] [4.161] [3.796] [5.905] [6.720] 
Services 0.441  -1.541  -5.363 7.225* 5.339  -3.84  -0.751 
  [3.753] [3.504] [5.811] [3.943] [3.694] [5.703] [6.318] 
Firm Growth  1.382  0.965  1.553 1.636 0.161  5.829*  0.256 
  [2.174] [2.021] [3.245] [2.072] [2.114] [3.305] [3.681] 
Small -25.212***  -27.358***  -7.033  -4.013 -2.281  -19.751***  27.386*** 
  [3.736] [3.385] [6.138] [4.097] [3.533] [5.844] [7.686] 
Medium -8.847***  -11.167***  -6.974 1.245 4.995 -2.621  18.915*** 
  [3.337] [2.956] [5.408] [3.628] [3.135] [4.911] [7.291] 
Financing Obstacle  5.945***  4.131***  2.94  2.391** 2.804** 4.527**  8.505*** 
  [1.154] [1.037] [1.855] [1.190] [1.091] [1.833] [2.156] 
GDP per capita  10.310***  7.110***  12.483*** 1.716  4.242*  1.8  -3.499 
  [3.431] [2.078] [4.387] [2.591] [2.516] [2.329] [2.474] 
Inflation 0.284  -1.454  -0.628 2.663** 0.008 4.674** -1.38 
  [1.249] [1.123] [2.047] [1.324] [1.194] [1.962] [2.137] 
Growth 66.031  5.97  -121.52 131.591  -27.95  85.417  160.464** 
 [78.245]  [59.915]  [160.567]  [113.474] [93.202]  [71.936]  [79.411] 
Value Traded  0.146  -1.532*  2.027 3.983*** -1.208  0.142  2.193** 
  [0.921] [0.789] [1.655] [0.995] [0.955] [0.817] [0.927] 
Constant -61.598*  -61.164***  -173.354*** -70.139***  -86.300*** -113.302*** -92.430*** 
  [31.859] [19.392] [43.057] [25.227] [24.262] [25.150] [27.464] 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared 162***  159*** 53***  53***  34*** 155*** 41*** 
Small-Middle 0.000***  0.000***  0.990 0.073*  0.007***  0.000***  0.073* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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Panel C:  Property Rights 
 
External 
finance  Bank Equity Lease  Supplier  Credit
Development 
Bank  Informal 
Government  3.832 -8.926** 1.798  -2.539  -4.438 31.750*** -8.103 
  [3.935] [3.727] [6.283] [4.003] [3.838] [5.101] [7.328] 
Foreign -0.445  -1.803  20.938***  -8.663** -5.928*  1.929  -0.195 
  [3.194] [2.882] [4.962] [3.514] [3.027] [5.002] [6.050] 
Exporter 6.133**  6.712***  0.376  5.128* 6.055** -4.354  0.312 
  [2.729] [2.492] [4.385] [2.768] [2.562] [4.316] [4.830] 
Subsidized 10.690*** -0.723  2.692 5.618 0.226  38.689***  -1.149 
  [3.747] [3.421] [5.837] [3.680] [3.522] [5.052] [7.014] 
Manufacturing 1.424  6.723*  -12.352** 1.563  6.942*  -6.426  -2.638 
  [3.936] [3.637] [6.209] [4.150] [3.795] [5.913] [6.743] 
Services 0.432  -1.043  -4.611 7.714* 5.199  -3.67  -0.058 
  [3.792] [3.538] [5.847] [3.943] [3.690] [5.684] [6.324] 
Firm Growth  1.573  0.781  1.557 1.227 0.256  5.760*  0.184 
  [2.177] [2.033] [3.264] [2.078] [2.104] [3.307] [3.700] 
Small -25.898***  -28.073***  -7.289  -3.999 -2.342  -19.850***  28.234*** 
  [3.756] [3.467] [6.221] [4.069] [3.534] [5.846] [7.655] 
Medium -9.523***  -11.377***  -6.796 1.203 4.958 -2.687  19.428*** 
  [3.326] [3.012] [5.413] [3.622] [3.130] [4.911] [7.258] 
Financing Obstacle  5.771***  4.127***  2.955  2.406** 2.826*** 4.614** 8.369*** 
  [1.153] [1.053] [1.850] [1.190] [1.091] [1.840] [2.160] 
GDP per capita  3.65  3.913  5.638  6.511**  1.982 0.991 0.945 
  [3.308] [2.960] [3.864] [2.786] [2.832] [2.468] [2.756] 
Inflation 0.482  -1.048  -0.276 2.745** -0.034 4.693** -1.258 
  [1.357] [1.189] [2.094] [1.344] [1.194] [1.964] [2.124] 
Growth 150.870*  -23.49  95.825 41.192 -2.136 88.234  157.322** 
 [90.993]  [80.404]  [134.019]  [99.572] [92.913] [71.533] [79.108] 
Property Rights  8.440**  6.652**  20.312***  2.334 0.536 1.942 -2.438 
  [4.165] [2.916] [4.807] [3.498] [3.471] [2.827] [3.237] 
Constant -39.309*  -53.684**  -194.530*** -132.482***  -65.016***  -114.559*** -129.637*** 
  [21.823] [22.949] [31.747] [20.876] [18.525] [21.246] [24.175] 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared 153***  150*** 75***  36***  32*** 155*** 37*** 
Small-Middle 0.000*** 0.000***  0.917 0.071*  0.006***  0.000***  0.063* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.  35
Panel D:  All Variables 
 
External 
finance  Bank Equity Lease  Supplier  Credit
Development 
Bank  Informal 
Government 6.22  -8.521**  1.478 -2.005 -4.012  33.769***  -7.403 
  [3.898] [3.710] [6.159] [4.082] [3.862] [5.294] [7.463] 
Foreign -0.715  -2.039  21.168***  -8.930** -5.963**  1.267  -2.186 
  [3.187] [2.881] [4.986] [3.526] [3.028] [5.017] [6.152] 
Exporter 6.412**  6.891***  -0.137 5.231*  6.208**  -3.982  0.506 
  [2.714] [2.486] [4.393] [2.787] [2.566] [4.322] [4.844] 
Subsidized 9.957***  -0.792  3.097 5.226 0.298  38.472***  -2.023 
  [3.734] [3.411] [5.854] [3.675] [3.525] [5.055] [7.037] 
Manufacturing 1.014  6.504*  -12.602** 1.097  6.990*  -6.932  -3.638 
  [3.885] [3.638] [6.215] [4.160] [3.803] [5.937] [6.757] 
Services -0.039  -0.962  -4.636 7.183* 5.313  -3.845 -1.263 
  [3.734] [3.531] [5.820] [3.944] [3.697] [5.715] [6.323] 
Firm Growth  2.198  0.95  2.163 1.607 0.193  5.922*  0.327 
  [2.176] [2.038] [3.236] [2.077] [2.110] [3.319] [3.694] 
Small -23.844***  -27.973***  -7.834  -4.061 -2.088  -19.391***  27.819*** 
  [3.712] [3.417] [6.140] [4.144] [3.539] [5.850] [7.719] 
Medium -7.951**  -11.212***  -7.322 1.311 5.156 -2.113  19.208*** 
  [3.343] [2.977] [5.425] [3.644] [3.141] [4.924] [7.331] 
Financing Obstacle  5.717***  4.041***  2.509  2.387**  2.865*** 4.814*** 8.186*** 
  [1.133] [1.048] [1.845] [1.185] [1.091] [1.846] [2.156] 
GDP per capita  1.432  4.021  0.407 2.509  3.44  1.116 -1.253 
  [2.301] [2.735] [3.663] [2.838] [2.804] [2.590] [2.831] 
Inflation 0.562  -1.16  -0.803 2.653** 0.081 4.861** -1.389 
  [1.251] [1.161] [2.048] [1.330] [1.195] [1.967] [2.134] 
Growth -30.465  -28.964  367.219*** 111.697  -39.112  85.482  147.107* 
  [72.475]  [69.837] [111.703] [96.012] [83.620] [72.197] [79.652] 
Private Credit  0.985  3.747***  -6.282***  0.663 1.839 2.292 0.275 
  [1.058] [1.168] [2.379] [1.990] [1.990] [1.523] [1.650] 
Property Rights  13.484***  5.588**  23.342*** -2.358  1.078  0.799  -5.574 
  [3.373] [2.804] [4.503] [3.860] [3.642] [3.113] [3.508] 
Value Traded  -0.649  -1.499  3.720** 4.149***  -1.684  -0.355  2.643*** 
  [0.960] [0.958] [1.790] [1.135] [1.033] [0.886] [1.025] 
Constant -26.238  -49.290*  -157.260*** -66.411***  -83.030*** -110.758*** -87.558*** 
  [23.394] [25.646] [40.231] [25.474] [24.267] [25.459] [27.636] 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared 162***  166***  199*  53***  35*** 156*** 43*** 
Small-Middle 0.000***  0.000***  0.911 0.068*  0.007***  0.000***  0.068* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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Table V.  Determinants of Financing Patterns: Impact of Firm Size 
The estimated panel random-effects Tobit model is (1) Financing Source = α + α1 Government + α2 Foreign +α3 Exporter +α4Subsidized + α5Manuf. + α6 Services +α7 
Firm Growth +α8 Small +α9 Medium + α10 GDP per capita + α11 Inflation+ α12 Growth + α13  Private credit/Property Rights/Value Traded/All * Small + α14  Private 
credit/Property Rights/Value Traded/All * Medium + α15  Private credit/Property Rights/Value Traded/All * Large +ε.   Financing proportions are the proportion of 
investment financed externally, bank debt, by equity, leasing, supplier credit, development banks and money lenders (informal).  External finance is given by sum of bank, 
equity, operations and other finance.  Bank financing includes domestic and foreign bank financing.  Development bank is that provided by both development banks and 
the public sector.  Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has government or foreign ownership, respectively.  Exporter is a dummy 
variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Subsidized is also a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives subsidies from the national or local 
authorities. Manufacturing takes the value 1 for firms in manufacturing sector and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, Services takes the value 1 for firms in the services sector and 0 
otherwise.   Firm growth is given by sales growth.  Small takes the value 1 if the firm is a small firm and 0 otherwise.  Medium takes the value 1 if the firm is a medium 
firm and 0 otherwise. Financing Obstacles is an index which measures how problematic financing is to the operation and growth of a business. GDP per capita is real GDP 
per capita in US$.  Inflation is the log difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth is the growth rate of GDP in US$.  Private credit is the financial institutions’ credit 
to the private sector divided by GDP.  Value Traded is the value of shares traded to GDP.  Property Rights is rating from 1-5 of the degree to which property rights are 
protected in a nation.  Difference Significance (Small – Large) are p-values for the chi-squared distribution of the test statistic.  Detailed variable definitions and sources 
are given in the appendix.    
Panel A:  Private Credit 
 
External 
Finance Bank  Equity Lease  Supplier  Credit 
Development 
Bank Informal 
Small -9.707  -13.543  5.112  13.91  9.627  13.251  57.051 
  [8.896]  [8.087] [13.906] [9.790]  [8.649] [14.802]  [25.469]* 
Medium  -2.85 -5.748  -11.618 2.212 19.137 7.859 45.759 
  [8.282]  [7.372] [13.322] [9.287] [7.960]*  [13.306]  [25.473] 
Financing Obstacle * Small  3.761  1.79  -1.251  -0.052  2.934  -0.266  5.483 
  [1.817]*  [1.730] [2.887] [1.830] [1.768] [3.149] [2.911] 
Financing Obstacle * Medium  6.285  4.054  5.796  3.261  1.285  5.811  9.307 
  [1.694]**  [1.539]** [2.747]*  [1.710]  [1.566]  [2.641]* [3.310]** 
Financing Obstacle * Large  8.479  7.272  5.216  4.771  5.78  8.567  23.28 
 [2.403]**  [2.126]**  [3.872]  [2.725]  [2.325]*  [3.735]*  [7.255]** 
Private Credit * Small  5.636  5.02  -0.731  6.618  2.366  5.653  -2.828 
  [1.936]**  [1.702]**  [3.778] [2.702]* [1.777]  [3.053]  [2.182] 
Private Credit * Medium  4.195  3.634  1.186  1.329  0.672  2.212  2.826 
  [0.000] [1.412]* [3.492]  [2.131]  [1.518]  [1.836]  [2.267] 
Private Credit * Large  3.8  5.577  3.354  3.124  -0.592  0.585  18.203 
 [2.280]  [1.867]**  [4.240]  [3.001]  [1.973]  [2.503]  [7.771]* 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared  .  163*** 55***  46***  38*** 159*** 38*** 
Small-Large  0.440 0.797 0.296 0.284 0.178 0.191  0.009*** 
Small-Large  (GCF)  0.110 0.041** 0.170  0.135  0.321  0.067*  0.021** 
 
Panel B:  Value Traded 
  External Finance  Bank  Equity  Lease  Supplier Credit 
Development 
Bank Informal 
Small  -6.694 -11.877 5.887  11.886 11.268 11.007 48.399 
  [9.301]  [8.452] [14.254]  [10.026] [9.140] [15.348]  [25.453] 
Medium  -4.231  -6.421 -15.485 -1.344 18.763  7.272  35.538 
  [8.797]  [7.850] [13.750] [9.562] [8.539]*  [14.082]  [25.481] 
Financing Obstacle * Small  4.244  2.141  -0.821  0.31  3.108  -0.124  5.477 
  [1.831]*  [1.731] [2.883] [1.864] [1.771] [3.157] [2.916] 
Financing  Obstacle  *  Medium  5.889 4.023 5.112 2.933 0.962 5.416 9.167 
 [1.663]**  [1.512]**  [2.722]  [1.691]  [1.564]  [2.621]*  [3.315]** 
Financing Obstacle * Large  8.629  6.825  5.481  5.034  6.083  8.718  20.553 
  [2.362]**  [2.083]** [3.863]  [2.697] [2.282]**  [3.650]*  [7.002]** 
Value Traded * Small  1.762  0.092  5.34  5.939  -0.269  1.065  0.689 
  [1.415] [1.133]  [2.131]*  [1.294]**  [1.097] [1.351] [1.230] 
Value Traded * Medium  -0.506  -1.395  3.926  2.377  -1.786  -0.156  2.431 
  [1.304] [1.099]  [1.983]*  [1.130]*  [1.063] [1.067] [1.307] 
Value Traded * Large  0.16  -0.854  6.647  4.715  -1.693  -0.349  7.51 
  [1.456]  [1.225] [2.389]**  [1.479]** [1.215]  [1.461] [2.751]** 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared  152***  160*** 71***  62***  40*** 158*** 40*** 
Small-Large  0.178 0.375 0.553 0.425 0.199 0.448  0.020** 
Small-Large  (GCF)  0.135 0.078* 0.182  0.142  0.294 0.063*  0.044** 
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Panel C:  Property Rights 
 
External 
Finance  Bank Equity Lease  Supplier  Credit 
Development 
Bank  Informal 
Small  -55.976  -47.278 -9.842 21.671 -31.33 -12.118 78.296 
  [16.420]**  [15.010]**  [28.788]  [19.785] [15.771]* [26.724] [38.540]* 
Medium -4.315  -13.984  16.588  29.92  12.593  -2.253  48.32 
  [15.957] [14.171] [27.645] [19.332] [15.100] [24.853] [39.438] 
Financing Obstacle * Small  4.823  2.762  -0.457  -0.047  3.413  0.022  5.55 
  [1.833]**  [1.748] [2.887] [1.841] [1.772] [3.183] [2.940] 
Financing Obstacle * Medium  5.376  4.233  4.79  3.148  0.761  5.642  9.063 
  [1.692]**  [1.542]**  [2.730] [1.730] [1.568]  [2.654]*  [3.359]** 
Financing Obstacle * Large  7.774  6.4  4.636  5.428  5.551  8.548  19.327 
  [2.370]**  [2.098]** [3.854]  [2.737]* [2.278]* [3.675]*  [6.944]** 
Property Rights * Small  15.584  13.398  16.304  3.309  6.236  4.473  -3.991 
  [4.927]**  [3.205]**  [5.923]**  [4.140] [3.784] [4.438] [4.141] 
Property Rights * Medium  5.013  7.545  5.396  -0.09  -1.981  1.853  -0.902 
  [4.948]  [3.023]*  [5.620] [3.861] [3.676] [3.683] [4.317] 
Property Rights * Large  4.585  5.102  12.101  6.334  -3.703  -0.375  -1.575 
  [5.136] [3.432] [6.670] [4.669] [4.097] [4.559] [7.301] 
Observations  2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 2935 
Number  of  country  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Chi-squared  171***  163***  56*** 41*** 46***  158***  35*** 
Small-Large  0.002***  0.011**  0.497 0.477  0.004***  0.398 0.755 
Small-Large  (GCF)  0.315  0.175  0.281 0.092* 0.451 0.076*  0.065* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
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 Appendix Table AI 
Number of Firms in Each Country and Size Group 
 
The data source is WBES. A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees, medium size if it has between 51 and 500 employees 
and large if it has more than 500 employees. 
 
Total Number 







Argentina 73 23 32  18
Armenia 74 49 21  4
Belarus 78 22 48  8
Belize 14 7 6  1
Bolivia 62 21 21  20
Brazil 112 14 79  19
Bulgaria 87 49 31  7
Canada 56 14 30  12
Chile 65 23 20  22
China 54 26 16  12
Colombia 76 13 24  39
Costa Rica  48 13 18  17
Croatia 81 18 45  18
Czech Republic 68 43 18  7
Dominican Republic 62 11 23  28
El Salvador 37 11 12  14
Estonia 98 44 44  10
France 33 8 18  7
Germany 31 9 18  4
Guatemala 32 10 12  10
Haiti 42 14 15  13
Honduras 30 15 8  7
Hungary 79 46 25  8
Indonesia 30 12 12  6
Italy 24 4 11  9
Lithuania 62 49 11  2
Malaysia 21 10 6  5
Mexico 30 10 13  7
Moldova 72 24 40  8
Nicaragua 44 22 11  11
Pakistan 24 8 13  3
Panama 41 5 13  23
Peru 40 12 13  15
Philippines 69 20 37  12
Poland 163 65 81  17
Romania 88 53 28  7
Singapore 64 28 17  19
Slovak Republic 77 46 28  3
Slovenia 96 26 61  9
Spain 45 15 26  4
Sweden 67 29 27  11
Trinidad and Tobago 55 21 24  10
Turkey 103 40 50  13
Ukraine 164 75 72  17
United Kingdom 43 24 17  2
United States  34 17 9  8
Uruguay 47 7 25  15
Venezuela, RB  40 15 8  17
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  Appendix : Variables and Sources   
     
Variable Definition  Original  source   
Growth  Growth of GDP in current U.S. dollars, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita  Real per capita GDP, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate  Log difference of Consumer Price Index, average 1995-99  International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
line 64 
Private Credit  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)], where F is credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private 
sector (lines 22d + 42d), GDP is line 99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 
64) and P_a is the average CPI for the year. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) 
Value Traded  The value of shares traded divided by GDP, average 1995-1999.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) 
Property Rights  An index from 1(less) to 5(more) measuring the degree to which 
property rights are protected in an economy, averaged over 1995-1999.  
Heritage Foundation 
    
Firm Growth  Estimate of the firm's sales growth over the past three years.  World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Government  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government agency 
or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Foreign  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign company or 
individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Exporter  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, zero 
otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Subsidized  Dummy variable that takes on value one if firm receives subsidies 
(including tolerance of tax arrears) from local or national government 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the 
manufacturing industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the service 
industry, zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Agriculture  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in agriculture, 
zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES)   40
Construction  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in construction, 
zero otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
 
Variable Definition  Original  source   
Firm size  A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees, 
medium size if it has between 51 and 500 employees and large if it has 
more than 500 employees. 
Size is a vector of dummy variables, Small, Medium and Large  that 
indicate firm size. Small (or Medium or Large) takes  the value 1 if a 
firm is small (or medium or large) and 0 otherwise. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Financing Obstacle  How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business:  no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3), 
a major obstacle (4)? 
 World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
    
Equity finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
equity, sale of stocks 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Bank finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
local and foreign commercial banks. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Leasing finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
leasing arrangements. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Supplier finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
supplier credit arrangements 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Development finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
development and public sector banks. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Informal finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
informal money lenders. 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
External finance  Bank finance + Equity finance + Leasing finance + Supplier finance + 
development finance + informal finance 
World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
 
 
 
 
 